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1 . Introduction
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RESOURCES:
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
G. Chichilnisky
Columbia University
and
Institute for Mathematics and its Applications
University of Minnesota
Physical considerations alone cannot explain the volatile behavior of
resource prices, or the effects these have on different regions of the world .
	
An
optimization analysis may not suffice either, since typically there are several
distinct objectives : conservation, cost-minimization, and the maximization of
revenues by resource exporters . These issues require an economic analysis of
markets.
Markets for resources interact rather strongly with other markets for
goods such as food or industrial products and for inputs to production such as labor
and capital. Such interactions are best studied with general equilibrium tools .
These tools explain trade and the determination of prices across different markets .
In a general equilibrium model, different economic agents have typically different
objectives, a useful feature for the study of resource markets . Trade in resources
takes place largely across different regions, so one is dealing with international
trade .
A general equilibrium model of a market economy consists of a set of
simultaneous, generally nonlinear, equations . A solution determines market prices
and the quantities employed, produced, consumed and traded by the various agents
in different markets. One aims to understand the qualitative changes of a solution
consequent upon changes in the exogenous parameters of the system. This is
generally accomplished by studying relationships between the variables within the
75
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manifold of solutions described as the exogenous parameter changes . This method
is called "comparative statics" : it seeks to explain what determines the outcomes,
and how policies can be designed so as to obtain desirable solutions . The name
"comparative statics" is somewhat misleading, since the same method is used to
study the asymptotic behavior of dynamical systems in economics .
A system of simultaneous nonlinear equations can easily become
unmanageable, and require computer analysis . Computer solutions cannot, how-
ever, disclose laws of economic behavior, nor can they explain why and how certain
policies work . The challenge is therefore to represent the economy by a set of equa-
tions which is sufficiently simple to admit analytic or simple implicit solu-
tions and the study of their qualitative behavior, while at the same time
retaining the complexity needed to explore the issues involved . This paper
will show how to perform this task and apply the results to study policy
issues in the area of natural resources . We shall analyze :
1. The connections between resource exports, their prices, and the
distribution of income within the exporting economy;
2 . When a country should export more, and when less;
3 . How the prices of resources affect employment, output and industrial
prices within a resource importing region;
4 . The effects of monopolistic resource prices on the prices of industrial
goods which are traded in exchange for the resource :
5 . Whether or not higher oil prices lead to lower GDP in an importing
region, and whether there are cases where both the buyer and the seller
of a resource may benefit from a given price change ;
6 . The effects of loans from a resource importer to a resource exporter
when these are used to expand resource-extraction in the exporting
region ;
7 . The effects of (unpaid) loans on the price of the resources exported ;
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8 . The welfare effects of loans on the lending region : can an (unpaid)
loan make the lender better off and the borrower worse off and if so,
under what circumstances?
The following sections will present general equilibrium models of increasing
complexity designed to analyze these questions, and theorems obtained on these
issues.
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2. The North-South Model
A. Specification of the Model
This section summarizes the general equilibrium model introduced in
Chichilnisky (1981, 1983) . There are two regions, North and South . The North
represents the industrial countries, the South the developing countries . Each region
produces and consumes two goods : basics (B) and industrial goods (I) . There are
two inputs to production : capital (K) and labor (L) . Basics can also include a
natural resource or a raw material. The two regions trade with each other .
Consider first the economy of the South . It produces basics and industrial
goods using labor and capital, as described by the Leontief production functions
BS = min(LB/a l, KB/c l)
IS = min(LI/a2 , KI/c2) ,
where the superscripts B and I denote the sector in which inputs are used, and
the superscript $ denotes supply. Efficiency requires that firms always use
factors in fixed proportions :
LB/KB = al/c l and LI/KI = a2/c2 .
We can now write the equations that specify the model . Competitive behavior on
the part of the firms ensures zero profits, so that
pB
= a1w + c1r (2.1)
pI = a2w + c2r (2.2)
where pB and pI are the prices of B and I; w and r are the wages and the rate
of return on capital . Equations (2 .1) and (2 .2) embody the information given
by the production functions for B and I. 1
1 Equations (2 .1) and (2.2) are equivalent to the production functions when firms
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Labor and capital supplied are increasing functions of their rewards :
LS = a(w/pB)
+ L
KS = (3r + K
We now give market clearing conditions (superscript S denotes supply
derives equation (2 .2) .
i .e., the value of exports equals the value of imports. 2
are competitive . Profits are zero in this case, which means revenues equal costs,
i . e., pBBS = wLB+ rKB. Now from the production functions BS = LB/a1 = KB/c1,
so that pBBS =a 1wBS+c 1rBS, or pB = aIw+c1r, equation (2: 1) . Similarly, one
It is worth noting that in this model when all markets clear, the value of domestic
demand pBBD+pIID equals the value of domestic income wL+rK . This is called
Walras' Law or the national income identity. From (2 .1) -(2. 11) one obtains :
pBBD+pIID = pBB
S-XB)+pI(IS+XII ) = pBBS+p?S = (aIw+cIr)BS+(a2w+c2r)IS
= wL+rK. In view of this, and its homogeneity properties (solutions only depend
on relative prices) the model is consistent with a standard Arrow-Debreu gen-
eral equilibrium model, for some set of preferences .
and D denotes demand) :
LS = LD (2.5)
KS = KD
(2.6)
LD = LB + LI = BSa1 + ISa2 (2 .7)
KD = KB + KI = B
Sc1
+ ISc2 (2 .8)
BS = BD +XB, where XB denotes exports of B (2.9)
ID D S= XI + I , where XD denotes imports of I, (2 .10)
nd
PBX
S D__
B PIXI (2.11)
(a> 0) , (2.3)
(~ > 0) . (2 .4)
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The North is specified by a similar set of equations (2 .1) - (2 . 11), with
possibly different technology and factor supply parameters . In a world equili-
brium, the prices of traded goods are equal across regions (factors K and L
are not traded) and exports match imports :
PI(S)
= pI(N) (2 .12)
PB(S) = pB(N) (2 .13)
XS(S) = XD(N) (2 .14)
Xi(N) _ XP(S) (2 .15)
where letters S and N in brackets denote South and North respectively .
In each region there are eight exogenous parameters : a1 , a2 , c 1 , c2 ,
a, and K, making a total of sixteen exogenous parameters for the North-
South model . When we add the price normalizing condition, 3
PI
we have a total of 26 independent equations : (2 . 1) - (2 . 11) for North; (2 . 1) - (2 . 11)
for South, (2 . 12) through (2 . 14) and (2 . 16) . 4 There are in total 28 endogenous
variables, 14 for each region : w, r, LS, LD, KS, KD, BS, BD, XB, I , I , XID,
pB'
pI. Therefore the system is underdetern imedup to two variabies5 Thus, we
D
now specify two more variables exogenously, industrial demand in the South, I (S)
and in the North, ID(N) . Obviously we could have solved the model by specifying
other variables, or else by postulating demand equations ; this will be done
in the following sections . The demand specifications of the model are chosen to
meet two criteria : analytical tractability and empirical plausibility .
3 All relations in this model are homogeneous of degree zero in prices, i .e ., only
relative prices (rather than the price level) matter . Therefore, one normalizes
the model by fixing the price of one good (the numeraire) equal to 1 .
4
It is easy to see that (2 .15) is always satisfied when (2 . 11) is satisfied in each
region and (2 . 12) through (2 . 14) hold.
5 This is not surprising, since demand behavior, or preferences, have not been
specified so far .
for each region, plus I (S) and I (N) .
B .
	
Comparative Statics Results
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The North-South model is, therefore, a system of 26 equations in 26
variables, depending on 18 exogenous parameters : al , a2 , c 1 , c2 , a, L, A, K
D D
The economies of the North and of the South are identical except possibly
for the values of their exogenous parameters. Differences in the structural charac-
teristics of the two regions are described by differences in their exogenous para
meters . For instance, in the North the two sectors (B and I) use approximately the
same technology, i.e ., the economy is technologically homogeneous. This means
that a1/c 1 ^." a2/c2 so that the determinant D(N)
of the matrix of technical coef-
ficients
a1
a2
is close to zero in the North . In the South, instead, technologies are dualistic.
The two sectors use factors very differently, and D(S) is therefore large . In both
regions D(N) and D(S) are positive, which indicates that the B-sector uses labor
more intensively than the I-sector . Another difference arises in factor markets .
In the North labor is relatively more scarce, i .e ., less responsive to increases in
the real wage w/pB. This
means a(N) is small. In the South the opposite is true,
a(S) is large . The reciprocal relations hold in capital markets : P(N) is large,
and P(S) is small. These parameter specifications can be presented so as to be
independent of the units of measurements .
It is worth noting that while most equations are linear in the variables,
some are not (e . g. , (2 . 3) is nonlinear) . The solutions also display nonlinearities,
as we shall see in the following.
Recall that a North-South economy is defined by : equations (2 .1) through
(2 .11) for each region, and (2 . 12) through (2. 15) . Exogenous parameters are a1 ,
c 1 , a2 , c2 , a, 9, L, K for each region, and ID(S), ID(N) . Endogenous parameters
are pB, PI, w, r, LS, LD, KS, KD, BS, BD, XB, IS, ID, XD for each region.
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Therefore there are twenty-six independent equations in twenty-six variables,
and eighteen exogenous parameters .
Proposition 1 . A North-South economy has at most one solution . This solution
can be computed explicitly by solving one equation which depends on all exogenous
for
of trade" of the South, since pI = 1) and obtain:
p 2 (A + A(N)) + pB[C + C (N) + I D (S) + I D (N)l - (V + V(N)) = 0 (2 .22)
A = Pa1a2~D
2
V=ac1D2
We now rewrite (2.17) as a function of one variable only, pB (which is the "terms
parameters of the model .
Proof. From
XD(S) = XI(N)
we have
ID(S) -IS(S) = IS(N) - ID(N) (2 .17)
Inverting (2 .7) and (2 . 8) we obtain
-
S c2L a2K
B (2 .18)D
a
1
K-c
1
L
IS = (2 .19)D
and inverting (2 .1) and (2 .2),
p
B
c2 -c 1w = (2 .20)D
a
l
p
Bc2r = D . (2 .21)
and
and where A, V and C have parameters for the South, and A(N), V(N) and C(N)
for the North.
	
Solving equation (2 .22) yields pB as a function of all exogenous
parameters of the system .
It is easy to check that (2 . 22) has at most one positive root pB. From
this, (2 . 20) and (2 .21), one obtains the wolutions wk and r* for each region;
from (2 . 3) and (2 . 4) L''` and K* for each region; from (2 . 18) and (2.19), (B5'~
and (I )* for each region. From (2 .9) we then obtain
(BD)* for each region, and
(ID(N))'x is computed from (2 .11) . All endogenous variables have been computed,
and the solution is complete.
The next theorem looks at the qualitative behavior of the solutions as an
exogenous parameter changes . We study changes in the levels of the exogenous
parameter ID(N) . Since for each ID(N) there is a unique equilibrium, we are
looking at a one-dimensional family of equilibria. Along this family of equilibria
the level of exports of the South changes . We are interested in the relationship
across equilibria between the level of exports XS(S) and the terms of trade, real
wages and consumption of the South .
Theorem 2 .	Considera North-South economy as above where labor is very
abundant in the South (a(S) large) .Anincrease in the volume of exports XS(S)
can lead to two different outcomes :
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RESOURCES
(ac1c2 -Aa1a2)1 - _
D c1L
- alK
+
D
If at the initial equilibrium c2/D < 2w/pB (e.g., technologies are dual
in the South, i .e ., D is large) , then an increase in exports leads to
lower terms of trade for the South (pB), lower export revenues (pBXB),
lower real wages (w/p), and lower domestic consumption (B
D
) inB
the South.
(2)	When c2/D > 2w/pB (e .g., technologies are more homogeneous, or real
wages smaller) an increase in exports leads instead to higher export
revenues (pBX
S
), higher terms of trade (pB), higher real wages (w/pB)
and higher consumption in the South.
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Proof; Across equilibria, the following equation is satisfied:
XS(S) = BS(S) -BD(S) -
(c2LDa2K) - (wL+rK -I
D
(S) , (2 .23)
B pB
where the second equality comes from (2 .18) and the Walras Law of footnote 2 .
Substituting L and K as functions of w and r, and w and r as functions of pB
(from (2 .3), (2 .4), (2 .20) and (2 .21)) we obtain
XS(S) =
act
c
- c l	+ 9a1
a
- al c1L -a1K + ID S
B D2p 2 pB D2 Z pB DpBp BB
(2 .24)
We have therefore expressed the level of exports XS as a function of the terms
of trade pB only . We can now consider the derivative across the manifold of
equilibria of XS with respect to pB :
8XS	acl acl(3 i a1K - c1L ID S-
22 pB -c 2 +
22 + 2
B D p
p
D PBP B
When a is large (and (3 small) 8XB/apB has the sign of
_c2 _ _2w
D pB
by (2 .20) . Therefore, when c2/D < 2w/pB
(case (1)), an increase in the volume
of exports leads to a lower solution value p'B; when c2/D > 2w/pB the opposite
S S
is true : as XB rises,
so does pB. Our last task is to examine the impact of XB
on real wages, consumption and export revenues of the South.
It is easy to check that in case (1) (c /D < 2w/p ) export revenues2 B
pBXB
fall as exports increase . This is because a higher level of XS in this case
leads to a lower p'x and from (2 .20) to a lower (w/p )* and a higher r''` . By (2.3),B B _
(2 .4) and (2 .19), this means that (I
S.,
)'` increases . Since ID(S) is a constant,
D has decreased. Therefore by (2 . 11), (p XS)"xX drops . The opposite effects
I B B S
happen in case (2) : pB increases, and so do pBXB and w/PB.
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The effect of exports on domestic consumption is also easy to check.
In case (1) (c2/D < 2w/pB), p'B drops, (w/pB)'
x drops and r* increases . From
(2.3) and (2 .4) L* drops and K''` increases . This means that (BS)''` drops, from
(2 .18) . Since
BD = BS - XS .
(BS)* dropped and (XB)~k increases, (BD)'k must now be lower. The opposite
happens when c2/D > 2w/PB . This completes the proof.
It is of interest to examine what drives this result. For exports to increase,
the difference between domestic supply and demand for basics must be wider . If
an increases in prices pB leads to proportionately higher increase in demand than
in supply, then exports can only rise when prices drop. This is case (1) : the
expression c2/D-2w/pB measures the relative strength of the supply and demand
responses as prices pB change, c2/D coming from the supply and 2w/pB from
demand. Notice that we do not refer here to standard supply and demand responses
to prices when all other variables are kept constant . We refer instead to general
equilibrium effects : as prices change everything else does too : employment, real
wages and thus also income . Wage income wL increases with higher prices pB,
so that the general equilibrium effect of higher prices on demand is positive . How-
ever, the standard partial equilibrium effect of prices on demand, when all other
variables are constant, is in general negative . From the proof of Theorem 2 we
obtain:
Corollary 3 .	Theterms of trade of the South, pB, are always positively associated
with wage income wL and negatively associated with capital income rK 'n both
regions .
The above results show how a system of 26 equations in 26 variables can
be solved analytically to yield qualitative results . In particular we showed the con-
nectionacross equilibria between the volume of exports of the South XB and main
aggregate variables of the South: real wages, consumption levels, export revenues .
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Theorem 2 shows how to answer questions (1) and (2) in the Introduction .
The connection between exports XB and their price is given by equation (2.24) in
Theorem 2 . The distribution of income, measured here as the relative level of
wages w (or real wages w/pB) and the return on capital r, is in turn changing
with exports through the relationships (2 . 20) and (2. 21), as pointed out in Corollary
3 . Finally, Theorem 2 shows when a country should export more (a large,
c2/D > 2w/pB) or less (a large, c2/D < 2w/pB) .
The next section will focus on the responses of the importing economy
to exogenous changes in resource prices .
3 . A Monopolistic Resource Exporter
A.
	
Specification of the Model
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The previous model dealt with trade in which prices adjust so as to clear
the markets. No single agent influences prices; the economic agents are,
therefore, "competitive . " This section will deal instead with a case where one
region fixes the price of the resource it exports . This agent is therefore called
a monopolist .
The model of the last section will now be modified to include one more
input of production, oil . The price of oil is now an exogenously set parameter .
We shall focus on the effects of changes in oil prices on the economy of the im
porter. For this purpose we concentrate on modelling the economy of the North.
This model was introduced in Chichilnisky (1981b) .
The North produces basics (B) and industrial goods (I) using capital (K),
labor (L) and oil (0)
BS = min(LB/a1 , 0B/bl , KB/c 1)
IS = min(LI/a2, 0
1
/b2, KI/c 2) .
The "zero profit" price equations, as explained in the previous sections, are
pB
= a1w + bIpo + cIrp1	(3 .1)
pI
= a2w + b2po
+ c,2rpI (3 .2)
K=(3r, 0>0 . (3 .4)
where pIr denotes here the "user's cost" of capital . Supplies of
depend on their rewards :
labor and capital
LS = aw/pB , a > 0 (3 .3)
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Next we formulate a demand equation, which substitutes for the exogenously set
industrial demand ID of the previous section :
PBBD = wL (3 .5)
i .e ., wage income is spent on basics. This relation is not necessary to prove
the results, but it simplifies considerably the computations .
The market clearing conditions are
LD = LB + LI = a1BS + a2IS (3 .6)
KD = KB + KI = c1BS + c2IS (3 .7)
0D I= 0B +0 = b1BS + b2IS (3.8)
KS = KD (3 .9)
LD = LS (3 .10)
0D = 0S (3 .11)
BD = BS (B is not traded internationally) (3 .12)
ID + XI = IS (XI are exports of I) (3.13)
PrXI
S D= poXO (value of exports of I equals value of imports (3.14)
of oil)
0D = XD (the North imports the oil it consumes) (3 .15)
0
and basics are the numeraire
pB = 1
(3 .16)
As before, the Walras Law or national income identity is identically
satisfied when (3 . 1) through (3. 15) hold: the value of domestic demand equals
the value of domestic income
The monopolistic oil-exporter model is specified as follows . Its exogenous
parameters are the technical coefficients al , a2, bl , b2, c1 , c2; the supply para-
meters a and 0; and the price of oil, p0.
There are sixteen endogenous variables : pB, PI,
r, w, LD, LS, KD,
S D S D S S D D SK , B , B , I , I , XI , 0
	
, X0 , 0 ; and sixteen independent equations (3 . 1)
through (3 .16) . Therefore there are, as before, as many variables as independent
equations, and the solutions will generally be (locally) unique . The following
results explore the effects of changes in the exogenous price of oil pe on the fifteen
endogenous variables of the North . To simplify computations we now assume the
following stylized conditions :
I . a1 b2 - a2b1 = M > 0, i .e., B is relatively more labor-
intensive and I more oil-intensive ;
II . c 1 = 0, i.e ., B requires no capital income (this condition is
not necessary, but simplifies greatly the computations) ;
III . b 1 is small, i .e ., B requires relatively few oil inputs .
where D = a1c2 - a2c1 .
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PBBD + PIID = wL + rK . (3 .17)
Proposition 4. The monopolistic oil-exporter model has at most
each price of oil po. This solution can be explicitly computed
equation .
one solution for
by solving one
Proof. Equations (3 . 6) and (3 . 7) imply
BS = (c 2L - a2K)/D (3 .18)
and
IS = (a 1K - c1L)/D (3.19)
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The price equations (3 . 1) and (3 .2) yield
and
Substituting in (3 .18) K and L from (3 . 3) and (3 . 4) and then w and r from (3 . 20)
and (3 . 21) one obtains
BS
(c law -a20r)
act Pa2 LO a2= = 2 (c2+poN -c1PI) + 2 .-M + -_D
D D pI PI
where M = a1b2 - a2b1 and N = c1b2 - bIc2 .
From BD = wL and BS = BD, one obtains, when pB = 1,
where
a
ac2(c 2+poN - clpI) + Pat POM + p - al( I I
When cl = 0, this yields an explicit relation between the price of oil and the price
of industrial goods
w -
(PB -bl
o)c2-(PI
-b2Po)cl (3 .20)
D
a (p -b p )-a (P - b P )
r= 1 I
20 2 B to (3 .21)
D
= arl
-blpo)c2
- (pI-b2Po c1J2
(3 .23)
From equation (3 .24), there exists at most one solution pI for each po.
Given pi, we obtain all other endogenous variables as follows : w'x obtains from
(3 .20), r* from (3 . 21), L* and K'k from (3 .3) and (3 . 4),
(BS)* and (IS) * from
D
(3 .18) and (3 . 19) and (B ) from (3 .5) .
(9D)* = (X~ obtains from (3 . 8), and
a
2
+ Po
M
PI 'Yb lpo(blpo -1)
+a l
(3 . 24)
2
a c2
p a2
therefore from (3 .14) one obtains (
	
. All endogenous variables are uniquely
determined . This completes the proof.
The next results explore the comparative statics properties of changes
in the price of oil, p0 .
B. Comparative Statics Results
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Theorem 5 . Conside r a monopoli stic exporter model as in Proposition 4. An
increase in the (monopolistically set)_price of oil has the following effects : If
the initial price of oil is low, increases in this price benefit_the_ exporter;_ the
volume of industrial goods traded in exchange for oil XI increases . However,
- Safter a price po has been reached, the volume of industrial exports XI decreases
with further increases in the price of oil : the monopolist loses from increasing
h rice po . There are two cases .
(A) act < 2pa1a2 . In this case po = 1/2b1 , and the rate of profit r rises
and falls with the level of exports XI , see Figure
(B) Pct > 29ala2 . In this case
-	1 ('Y-2a1)1/2 1
Between po
and 1/2bl, r increases and XS decreases . Between 1/2b and
S(1/bl) -po the opposite happens : XI increases and r drops. see Figure 2 .
Therefore in case (A) the oil exporter and the oil importer can both benefit
from an increase in po when po < 1/2b 1 and from a decrease in po when po > 1/2b1 .
This is provided that their aim is to maximize returns on capital (r) and the volume
of industrial exports traded for oil (XI ) respectively .
In case (B), there are areas where both traders benefit from a price
increase (po < po) or from a price drop (po > (1/bl) -po) . Outside those areas ,
the traders have conflicting interests .
G. CHICHILNISKY
Figure 1 .
	
Case 1 : act > 20a1a2, i . e . , r is always bounded below al/2D.
In this case, as the price of oil p increases, the volume of industrial
exports X(p ), and the rate of re?urn on capital r(p ) increase and
decrease together . 0
r, X
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RESOURCES
Figure 2 .
	
Case 2 : In this case, the rate of return on capital r and the level of
industrial exports traded for oil X, do not move in the same direction
in regime B. There are therefore regions with community of interests
for the traders, and others where there are conflicting interests .
93
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Proof. By (3 . 21) r is a function of pI and po . By (3 .24) pI
= p,(po), These two
relations yield
so that
so that
r =
aa21
(P - b1Po)
1
a
2
o
ac bdr = 2 1 (1 -2pb) .dpo	Pa1a2 o 1
Also, since XI = IS -ID, from (3 . 19), (3 . 5) and (3. 17)
r
SX = ,
(a 1
	-r
2
) (3 .26)
S
(a,
d
I
=~ D
_2r d
r
po po
An examination of equations (3 .25) through (3 . 27) suffices to prove the results.
Equation (3 .25) means that r is a quadratic function of po , r0 = 0 when
po
= 0, r0 =0 when po attains its maximum feasible value 1/b1 . The maximum
value of r,
2
_1 ac t
4 Pa1a2
is attained when po = 1/2b l . From equation (3 . 27) when a 1/D > 2 max r, then
dXi/dpo has the same sign as dr/dpo. Now, a1/D > 2 max r if and only if
al _1 ac2
D > 2 Pa1a2
as in Figure 2 . This completes the proof.
i . e . , ac2 < 20a a . This is case (A), see Figure 1 Case (B) is when ac 2 > 2~a a9 1) .
1 _ 1	~-2a
1/2 2 _ 1
1
(y-2a)1/2)
po 2b 1 7 0 p0 2b 1 + It1
(3 .25)
(3 .27)
' 2 12
In this case dX
I
I/dpo has the opposite sign to dr/dpo" when p01 < p0 '< p20, for
The previous theorem does not explain the impact of oil prices on the
GDP of the importing region . This is measured as the total value of domestic
output minus the value of imported inputs :
GDP = Y = pBB + pII - po9 .
Theorem 6 .
	
For very low prices of oil, an increase in po lowers the GDP of
the importer. However, after a price p0 has been reached, further increases
increase the GDP, up to p0 . From this latter point on, the effect of oil prices
on GDP is again negative .
Proof : From (3 . 3), (3 . 4), (3 . 5) and (3 . 17),
so that
dY = a2w dw + A
(r2
+ I + p 2r
dr
(3 .29)dp dp dp I dp0 0 0 0
Note that from (3 .20)
Also, since pBBD = wL = awl,
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(3 .28)
pod=
w -b 1 c2/D < 0 (3 .30)
D
dB = a2w dw < 0 .
dpo dpo
Furthermore, r = 0 when p0 = 0 . Therefore (3 .29) implies that for small values
of P0, Y is a decreasing function of p0 , dY/dpo < 0 . However, since dr/dp0 > 0
for p0< 1/2b1 and b1 ^" 0, when PO exceeds a small value (denoted po
), Y is
an increasing function of the price of oil . This is due to the fact that as p in-
0
creases, the value of demand for I, pIID increases, since dr/dp0 and dpI/dpo > 0
for
1/2
PO
<
2b 1+(
~
2~1
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Since bl
is rather small, the increase in pIID within Y exceeds the decrease in
DpBB , so that Y increases with the price of oil. Figure 3 illustrates this result
from a computer simulation of the model.
Finally, when po exceeds a value p40 ,
dY/dpo turns negative again,
because r = 0 when po assumes its maximum value l/bl , dr/dpo < 0 for
PO > l/2b l ,
dBD/dpo < 0 and rdpl/dpo is bounded above by
since
Mae2b1
PaIa2
10
dpI M(a1 +b1-,p0(b1p0
-1)) - (a2+paM),yb1(2p0b1 -1)
dpo
(al+7bIpo(pob1
- 1)
)
2
a
for Y = c
2
2/a2 . This completes the proof.
The last two theorems answer questions 3, 4 and 5 of the Introduction.
They show how the price of an imported resource affects prices, output and exports
of the importing region. They show how a monopolistic resource exporter should
take into account the effect of its prices on the importing economy : when to raise
and when to decrease resource prices . Finally, they demonstrate cases where the
importer and the exporter have a conflict of interest, and others where both could
benefit from a rise, or a fall, in resource prices .
C . Computer Simulation
The following is a computer simulation of this model . The following values
of the exogenous parameters are given :
Exogenous Data
a = 1 . 00 b =l
0 . 10
= 2.00 b2 = 0.20
al = 0.30 cl = 0.001
a2 = 0.20 c2 = 0.60
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As explained in Proposition 4, a solution of the model is computed by
resolving one equation in po, equation (3 . 23), and computing all other endogenous
variables from po .
	
The following table reproduces the numerical results for
different values of the price of oil, po . Figures 3 and 4 reproduce graphically
these results . Figure 3 illustrates the response of GDP = Y, the rate of return
on capital r, the volume of industrial exports X, wages w and the price of in-
dustrial exports, as the price of oil varies. Figure 4 illustrates the connection
between oil prices po and oil exports 8S, across equilibria of the North-South
economy .
TABLE 1
Exogenous
PO PI r w
Endogenous
Pix Y 03
0.0 0.668901 0.5574d-02 3.3332 0.337150d-16 11 .1111 1.01
0.5 0.858613 0.243452 3.16597 0.580648 10.1251 1.16
1 .0 1 .10132 0.456505 2.99832 1.20033 9.44897 1.20
1 .5 1.41239 0.644688 2.83030 1.84227 9.18463 1.228
2.0 1.80953 1.807918 2.66179 2.48953 9.44742 1.244
2.5 2.30945 0.946045 2.49272 3.12497 10.3476 1.249
3 .0 2.91912 1.05883 2.32303 3.73121 11 .9419 1.243
3.5 3.61864 1.14595 2.15284 4.29064 14.1388 1.225
4.0 4.33894 1.20707 1.98254 4.78579 16 .5742 1.196
4.5 4.95548 1.24203 1.81282 5.20000 18.5754 1.155
5.0 5.33000 1.25113 1.64444 5.51801 19 .3906 1.103
5.5 5.38881 1 .23504 1 ..47782 5.72565 18 .6234 1.041
6.0 5.16262 1.19450 1.31278 5.80860 16 .4559 0.968
6.5 4.75047 1.12996 1.14887 5.75144 13 .4507 0.884
7.0 4.25777 1.04152 0.985218 5.53761 10 .2080 0.791
7.5 3.76058 0.929042 0.821688 5.14990 7.16683 0.686
8.0 3.30079 0.792336 0.657949 4.57096 4.57735 0.571
8.5 2.89531 0.631209 0.493908 3.78351 2.55107 0.445
9.0 2.54664 0.445510 0.329551 2.77048 1.11951 0.307
9.5 2.25047 0.235131 0.164903 1.51491 0.276035 0.159
10 .0 2.00000 0.385923d-01 0. 0.257568d-15 0.595746 0.000017
Po
10
7.5
5
2.5
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Figure 3 . The volume of oil exports and the price of oil across equilibria.
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Figure 4. Results from a simulation : note that the GDP, Y, of the oil importer
rises and then falls with increases in the price of oil, p0
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Debt and Resource Exports
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In this section we extend the North-South model to study the impact of
debt on the resource -ikr'porting and resource exporting economics . We allow
here for an imbalance in the trade account, which is matched by an inflow
of overseas investment or a financial transfer . This imbalance represents
the debt owed to foreigners, and is directed towards the expansion of oil
supplied. Except for the wedge between export revenues and import costs,
which represents the debt, the model is consistent with a standard competitive
genpral'-equilibriunfi specification . The model was introduced in Chichilnisky,
Heal and INSaLeod (1984) .
The introduction of the debt wedge changes the main relations in the model:
the operation of Walras' Law or the national income identity in both countries is
altered. Overseas transfers lead to changes in oil supplies and consequently
most variables adjust. As the debt increases, a new equilibrium emerges with
different prices and levels of imports and exports . There are also changes in
all domestic variables in both South and North: real wages, profits, domestic use
of industrial and consumption goods, and employment of the factors labor, capital
and oil. This allows us to trace the impact of the debt on the major macro vari-
ables of the two countries . The model could also be used to examine the impact of
rescheduling, i.e ., repaying the debt over a different time period, or of repaying
it at a different rate of interest .
Following the macroeconomic impact analysis, two main questions emerge .
The first is, who benefits and who loses from the accumulation of debt; and the
second is, whether there exist debt-management policies that could make both
countries better off, after taking fully into account the recycling effect of borrowing
funds on imports from the lender .
The interest of the results lies in part in their simplicity and in part in
the fact that they account for the impact of the debt on all markets simultaneously .
Fairly simple analytical solutions are obtained to the rather complex questions
posed . These are obtained, of course, at the cost of somewhat stylized assumptions.
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We describe conditions under which increasing the debt leads the country
to export more oil. In certain cases, this leads to lower prices of oil, lower
volumes of industrial imports, lower real wages, and higher profits in the oil
exporting country . In other cases, the results are reversed, and real wages,
consumption, and terms of trade all improve in the exporting country. The out-
come depends on the technologies of the South an on the initial prices .
We also examine conditions under which the economy of the North actually
benefits in macroeconomic terms from its loan to the South: because of lower oil
prices, the consumption of both goods increases in the North when the transfer
or loan increases. This occurs because the transfer leads to better terms of
trade in the North, and because its production system is relatively homogeneous.
This result is reminiscent of the argument that British investment overseas in
the nineteenth century benefited the country by developing overseas supplies of
food and raw material, thus making these supplies more elastic, keeping down
prices, and improving the UK's terms of trade . Essentially we are specifying
here conditions for overseas investment in material supplies to benefit the in-
vesting country even before any financial returns are paid, or in the case of a
loan, before the loan is repaid.
A. Specification of the Model
There are two regions, the North and the South. Each produces two
goods, denoted B and I, with three factors of production, capital, K ; labor, L;
and oil, 0 . The South exports an input, oil, in exchange for a good, the 'industrial"
good I. The "basic" good B is produced domestically and not traded internationally .
We first specify the model for one region, namely the South. In what
follows, the subscripts S and D will be used to denote supply and demand, and
the superscripts N and S to denote variables or parameters referring to the North
and South, respectively . All variables or parameters without a superscript refer
to the South. The superscripts B and I after a factor (e . g. , LB, KI) denote the
amount of that factor used in sector B or I, respectively .
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where r is the rate of profit .
	
pI and p9
will stand for the prices of industrial
goods and of oil, respectively . The demand for B derives from wage income
PBBD
= wL (4.5)
The South produces oil (within given bounds) without using either domestic capital
or labor . We shall assume that it uses the overseas borrowing or financial
transfer FT to increase its oil supplies
8
S
= 0S(FT) , MS/8FT >
0 (4.6)
This completes the behavioral specification for the South.
The equilibrium conditions for the South are :
where B is not traded internationally .
ID = IS +MI (4.8)
where MI denotes the South's imports of I.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN RESOURCES
The basic good is produced according to the relation
BS = min [LB/al , 0B/b1, KB/c11 (4.1)
and the industrial good according to
IS
= min [L'/a., 6I/b2 , K'/c.] (4.2)
Labor and capital supplies are responsive to their rewards :
LS = aw/pB , a > 0 (4 .3)
where w is the wage and pB the price of B, and
KS = Ar , 0 > 0 (4.4)
where FT denotes financial transfers .
Note that FT could be either positive or negative, depending on the
relative magnitudes of the debt service and the financial credit.
	
However, the
effect of a transfer (FT positive) may not be symmetric with that of a repayment
(FT negative), because of the irreversibility of the investment in the oil sector :
we assume that the financial transfer FT is used to purchase industrial goods to
augment the supply of oil . This means that the new industrial investment in the
oil sector is paid for by foreign loans . Hence, oil supplies eS change as the debt
level changes; the debt is assumed to increase with increases in the level of the
transfer (FT positive) . The balance-of-payments condition (4.15) is that imports
of industrial goods exceed export revenues by FT . As the demand for the basic
good B comes entirely from wage income (4.5), the national income identity
((4.16) below) implies that the demand for industrial goods comes from the profit
income rK, oil revenues peX0, and the borrowing FT, with the last of these
going to the oil sector . In the North we make a corresponding assumption, namely
that the financial transfer to the South is taken from income that would otherwise
have purchased industrial goods, so that the North's demand for industrial goods
is rK -FT.
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eS S= eD +X (4.9)
where X8 denotes oil exports by the South,
KS = KD (4.10)
LS = LD (4.11)
LD = BSa1 + ISa2 (4 .12)
KD = BSc 1 + ISc2 (4.13)
e
D
= BSb1 + ISb2 (4.14)
and the payments condition
pex9 = pIMI - FT , (4.15)
In an equilibrium situation, Walras' Law or the national income identity
of the South is always satisfied (see Chichilnisky, 1981a), i . e . ,
where 0 = e
S
is, as in (4 .6), a function of FT .
	
Equation (4.16) can also be re-
written as
pBBS
+ PI(IS+ M-5 = wL + rK + pe(eD+X5 + NF . (4.16)'
This completes the specification of the South.
The model of the North consists of the same 15 equations, but with possibly
different parameters a, 0, a1, a2, b1 , b2 , c 1 , c 2 . The following equation now
substitutes for equation (4 .6) in the South:
Of course, the equations corresponding to (4 . 8) and (4.9) reflect the fact that the
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pBBD - PIID = wL
+ rK + pes + FT (4 .16)
e
S
= 0 , (4.6)1
where XI' and M8 represent, respectively, the North's exports of I and imports
of oil. There are therefore two sets of eight exogenous parameters each, one set
for the North and the other for the South . Each set contains a, (3, al, a2, b1, b2,
c1 and c2 . These parameters are generally different in the two regions .
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North imports oil and exports industrial goods .
prices of the traded goods must be equal :
In a world trade equilibrium the
S N
P0
__
P0
(4.17)
S N
pI
__
PI
(4 .18)
and traded quantities must also match :
X0S N= M0 (4.19)
XI = MI (4 .20)
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We make certain stylized assumptions to simplify computations : a is
large in the South and relatively smaller in the North, indicating that labor is more
"abundant" in the South. The corresponding parameters for capital exhibits the
opposite behavior : g is large in the North than in the South. We shall also assume
that c1 is small in the South, i . e . , the production of basic goods uses little capital,
and a2 is small in the North, i . e . , Northern industry uses little labor .
There are a total of 33 independent equations for the complete North-South
system : thirty correspond to two sets of (4 . 1) through (4.15), one set for each region,
and three equations arise from the international trade conditions (4.17) through (4.20),
since of these four, as usual, only three are linearly independent . There are 17
endogenously-determined variables each in the North and in the South : pI . p6' PB'
w, r, LS, LD , KS, KD, BS, BD , IS, ID, MI, 6S, eD
and X0. Finally, we have the
transfer FT, making a total of 35 endogenous variables for the complete North-South
system.We therefore have 33 equations in 35 unknowns . When we choose the numer
aire (pe = 1) an equilibrium is determined up to one variable . If we fix exogenously
one variable, the equilibrium is (locally) unique . We choose this variable to be the
value of the transfer FT. The transfer or loan thus becomes a policy variable . In
the following we show how to compute explicitly a solution to the model, i .e., a
value for each of the endogenous variables for each value of FT . In particular, we
show that by successive substitutions the more important properties of the model
can be obtained from the study of a single e uation, giving an implicit relationship
between the financial transfer FT and the relative prices of industrial goods and oil .
There are a number of determinants whose signs are important in the
following, and which determine factor intensities in the different sectors . We have
the following technical input-output coefficients :
a
2
b
2
c
2
in each region . The determinants to be used are :
D a1c2 - a2c1 0 M c1b2 - b1c2	' Q a2b1 - a1b2
The assumptions are :
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DN >0, DS >0, MS <0, QN <0 .
The positivity of the determinant D implies that the basic goods sector is relatively
more labor intensive and the industrial goods sector relatively more capital inten-
sive .
	
The assumption (made above) that the basic goods sector uses very little
capital in the South implies that ci is small and therefore that MS < 0 . The
industrial goods sector in the North was assumed to use little labor : hence a2 is
small and QN< 0 .
In order to solve the model we consider first the equation equating oil
exported with oil imported :
In view of (4 .6), (4 .9), and (4. 6)', this equals
X8 = Me (4 .21)
0S(FT) - 0D = 0ND , (4.22)
where the left-hand-side variables are from the South. From (4.14), (4.12) and
(4 .13)
where
Therefore, we may rewrite (4.22) as
0
D
=
D (c2L
- a
2K)
+
D
(a1K - c 1 L)
0S(FT) - D P M -B
- D p M - DQB
M = c1b2 - b1c2 , Q = a2b1 - a1b2
N N N
a-- (w/p )
NMN - --~- , (4 .24)
DN B DN
(4.23)
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Equation (4 . 24) is therefore an implicit equation in five variables, which we denote
Our next step is to write the rate of profit r and the wage w/pB
in the two regions
as functions of the prices of basic and industrial goods, pB and pI .
Recall that
oil is the numeraire (pe = 1) . From the production functions (4 . 1) and (4 .2) we
obtain the associated competitive price equations
pB
= aIw + b1pe
+ c1 r ,
pI
= a2w + b2p9
+ c2r , (4.26)
pB
_ b
1~
_
pI
- b
2
=
c2pB_ cIpI
+M
w _ D
in four, rather than five, variables :
0 (FT, r, w/pB, rN, (w/PB)N)
= 0 (4.25)
B DpB
a2
w
r
since p9 =
1 . We therefore obtain the factor-commodity price relations
(p -b 1)c 2
+ (b2 -pI)c 1Bw/o = (4 . 27)
(b 1 -pB)a2+ a1(pI-b2) aIpI - a2pB + Q
r D D
Substituting w/pB and r from (4 .27) into (4.25), we obtain a new implicit function,
r~(FT, pro PB' pB) = 0 (4 .28)
Recall that pN may be different from pS because B is not traded internationally .B
The last step is to substitute pB and pB as functions of pI into (4.28) . This will
lead to an implicit function in two variables
X(FT, pI) = 0 . (4 .29)
Since FT is an exogenously given parameter, (4.29) is an analytic solution to the
model : from (4.29) we may compute the equilibrium level of industrial prices
p (FT) . It is easy to check that once pI is known, we may solve for the equi-
librium values of all other endogenous variables.
	
This will be explained below .
Now, in order to obtain pB = PB(PI), we use another market-clearing
condition, this time in the B-market :
From (4 .12) and (4.13) this can be written as
or
from which we obtain
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D
BS = BD . (4.30)
c2L - a2K w L
pB
c2 w ~3a2r 2a D
P
-
B
D - a(w/PB) = 0
2
w =
c2 +
c2 -
Pa2r
pB D 4D2 Da
a two-branched function relating w/pB and r. The different parameter values
will determine which is the appropriate branch in (4 .32) .
Using again the factor-commodity price relations, (4.32) yields an implicit
relation between pB and pi
as desired :
c2 +
_ C2 la2
1/2
M c2 clpi
aDpB -
pB 4D2
- D2a (R -a2pB+a1PI) -
DpB
D + DpB 0 .
Substituting (4 . 33) into (4 . 28), we obtain the desired relation (4. 29) between FT
and pI,
X(FT, pi) = 0 .
(4.31)
(4.32)
(4.33)
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From (4.29) we may then compute pI = pi(FT) . From (4 . 33) we obtain p* (N)
and p* (S), and from these three equilibrium prices we obtain the equilibrium
rates of profit r*(N) and r'k(S), and of real wages, (w/pB) *(N) and (w/PB) (S) .
From these we obtain supply of labor and capital in the North and the South, and
using the inversion of (4.32) and (4.33) we obtain the output of B and I in both
regions . From the national income identity we may compute demand for I in
the South, which determines imports from the North, and from exports of oil
from the South. From (4 .14) we obtain oil demanded in the South, thus com-
pleting the computation of the equilibrium.
B. Main Results : Trade and Debt
This section studies the impact of a change in the net transfer FT on the
economies of the North and the South. Before going on to the algebra, it seems
useful to explain the economics of this impact.
An increase in the transfer FT increases oil supplies 9S, since the
South invests borrowed funds in expanding the oil sector . At the new equilibrium,
corresponding to higher FT, the total amount of oil utilized in the North and in the
South therefore increases . This in turn alters the supplies of both goods in each
region, possibly in different proportions . The composition of the product changes
in both regions.
The changes in supplies lead to new equilibrium prices for the two goods .
The prices of the factors labor and capital also change as relatively more or less
labor and capital are employed . This implies that total income in the North and
in the South are different at the new equilibrium . The results in this section give
simple sufficient conditions for determining the signs of each of these effects .
The first theorem gives conditions under which an increase inoil supplies
decreases the price of oil with respect to that of the industrial good. While it is
intuitively plausible that the price of oil should drop as supplies increase, this is
not always true . The second theorem gives conditions under which the relative
price of oil increases as the transfer increases oil supplies. Whether one or the
other result obtains depends on the relative strength of supply and demand effects,
and the general equilibrium solutions trace this in detail .
	
The results are obtained
from various assumptions on technologies and initial prices .
The next step is to explore the general equilibrium impacts of an increase
in the relative price of industrial goods . The rate of profit rises both in the North
and in the South. In the North, the rate of profit and the real wage move together,
because the North's economy is rather homogeneous . Therefore, both wage and
profit income increase in the North, and we show that there is also an increase in
the consumption of both goods, even allowing for the loss of national income due to
the transfer . All this occurs because the transfer has improved significantly the
North's terms of trade .
In the South, because of the rather different technologies in the two sectors,
the real wage moves in the opposite direction to the rate of profit . The transfer
increases oil supplies and oil exports, but oil revenues in terms of industrial goods
imported are reduced. Wage income and domestic consumption of basics decrease
as well . If one sought to improve wage income without negatively affecting indus-
trial consumption in the South, the economy of the South would have to be made
more homogeneous .
The second theorem explores a different set of assumptions, and arrives
at rather different conclusions. Now the transfer increases oil supplies, but it
alse increases the relative price of oil with respect to industrial goods . As the
terms of trade of the South improve, its macro variables react differently, and so
do the variables in the North. The conditions under which one or the other result
obtains are therefore quite relevant for policy, and should be determined empiri-
cally. The simulations for the case of Mexico in Chichilnisky, Heal and McLeod
(1984) are a first step in this direction.
A factor that plays an important role in determining the results of an
increase in the transfer FT is the sign of the expression
= [c2/D - 2w/pB]
where D is the determinant of the matrix
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a2 c2
The role and interpretation of this term have been discussed elsewhere (Chichilnisky,
1981a, b) . Basically, the sign of this expression determines whether income effects
will dominate price effects, so that increases in supplies will be proportionately
larger or smaller than increases in demand as prices change . We refer to an
economy as dual if c2/D < 2w/pB, since a large D would have this interpretation.
Conversely, the economy is homogeneous if c2/D > 2w/pB. It should be noted that
this condition can be written so as to be independent of the particular units of mea-
surement used .
Theorem 7.	Consider a North-South economy as defined above . Assume the
economy of the North to be homogeneous (c 2/D > 2w/pB) and that of the South to be
dual (c2/D < 2w/PB) . Suppose that at the initial equilibrium the price of industrial
goods and the rate of profit are relatively high in the North (pI < b2 and 2r > a1/D) .
Labor is relatively abundant in the South (a large) and capital relatively abundant
in the North (0 large) . In this case an increase in the transfer FT to the South has
the following conseauences :
Oil supplies and oil_ exports increase in the South.
The North exports, and the South imports, fewer industrial goods.
However, the terms of trade move in favor of the North (pI in-
creases) so much that its export revenues rise . There is a corre-
sponding fall in oil export revenues of the South denominated in terms
of its import I .
(iii) Profits and real wages rise in the North, so much that its consump-
tion of both goods increases .
(iv) In the South_profits rise, but employment, real wages, and con-
sumption of basics all fall .
Proof.
	
We consider first the market-clearing condition in the oil market,
From (4 . 6), (4 . 9), and (4 .6)', this equals
From (4.14),
and from inverting (4.12) and (4 .13) we obtain
In view of (4.3) and (4 . 4), we may rewrite (4.35)
of B and I :
0D
= D (c2L - a2K) + D (a 1K -c 1 L) . (4.37)
N
0S(FT) + D P M + D Q
-- - aN (w/pB)MN N Q (4.38)B D D
where M and Q are the determinants defined above . Equation (4.38) gives an
implicit relation between real wages and the rates of profits in both regions, and
the transfer FT, which we denote as
[rN, rS, (w/ N, (w/
S, FT] = 0 . (4.39)
Since factor prices are functions of commodity prices (see (4 .27)), we obtain from
the substitution of (4. 27) into (4 .38) a function linking the transfer FT to the prices
M
oS(FT) + 2 (c2pB _c lpI+M) +
D p
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X8 = Me (4.34)
0S(FT) - 0SD = 0D . (4 .35)
0D = b1BS + b2IS (4.36)
- pBa2+Q)B
(4 .40)
N N
+ 2 N
__2 M
(c 2 pB
-CNpI+MN) + Q(plaN -pBa2 +Q) = 0 .
(D
N
) pB ( )
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Equation (4 .40) is an implicit function of the form
r(FT, PI, PB . pB) = 0
However, the prices of basics pS and pB (which may be different since basics
are not traded) are themselves functions of the price of industrial goods pI in
equilibrium .
From equation (4 .33) we obtain :
PB = PB(PI) and PB = PB(PI)
Therefore, (4 .40) is actually an implicit function of pI and FT only
or equivalently its reciprocal
MT,
pI) = MT, PI' PS(P~' API)) = 0 (4 .41)
It is then possible to differentiate implicitly across equilibria and obtain apI/aFT,
dpI = - lap /IaFT,d I
This equation represents the change in the price of industrial goods that follows
an increase in the transfer FT . By (4.40) and (4.6)
Therefore the sign of (4 . 42) is always that of -at'/8pI.
obtain
d8df __S
dFT dFT
We may now compute the derivative -8r/apl . From (4.40) and (4.41) we
S
_dI' _ _ apB _ aM __ a2~
ac1M PQal
dpI apI D2
p2
(
M
-
clPI) D2	+ D2p D2B B
a 'B
( N
2MN
2 (MN - cNP) -
pI (D ) (PB) 1
1
(4.42)
(4.43)
aNcNMN
NQNa'
2(DN)pB
(DN)2
From expression (4 .43) we may compute the changes in p as FT changes, pro-
vided we know the signs of the derivatives dpB/dpI and dB/dpI across equilibria .
The next step is therefore to compute the signs of the derivatives of the
price of basic goods pB with respect to the price of industrial goods pI across
equilibria in each region.
	
For this we utilize the expression relating the real wage
and the rate of profit in each region, derived from the market-clearing condition
BS -BD =0 :
pa -p a +Q
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~a ract w 2 2- a(w/p ) = 0 (4.44)
(see equation (4. 31)), and also the equations relating factor prices to commodity
prices :
From (4 .46), by the implicit function theorem, in each region :
dpB _ _
dP CaP CaPI I B
Furthermore, from (4.45) we find that the partial derivatives
p c -pc +
w/ P =
B 2 I 1 (4 .45)
B
(see equation (4.27)) . Equation (4 .44) is an implicit expression between real wages
and profits in each region, denoted A(w/pB, r) = 0 . Since equations (4.44) and
(4.45) give real wages and profits as functions of commodity prices, (4.44) actually
gives an implicit relation between commodity prices in each region, denoted
VXPB , P~ = A P (PB , PI) . r(PB. P~] = 0 (4.46)B
_ _ a ~b
a(w/PB) + m ar - a(w/PB) + av) ar
[ a(w/p )
B apI	arapI
] [a(w/P ) apB ar apB B
(4.47)
a(w
/PB) __ _ cl 0 (4.4£3)
apI DPB
where
A = a(c2/d - 2w/PB)
From relation (4 .52) we may now determine the sign of dpB/dpI in both
the North and the South.
	
First note that dpB/dpI is always positive in the North
since pI > b2 , so that pIc 1 -M > 0, and t> > 0 by assumption . In the South A < 0,
but (3 is rather small . Therefore, (4.52) is also positive in the South. With this
information we may now return to equation (4.40) and compute al- /(3pI . As a is
large in the South and /3 is large in the North, we have from (4 .43) that the expres-
sion for -8f /apI
is dominated by the following terms:
aM ~ _dpB
crc 1M dpB a21~ QN gNQNaN
2 2 (M -c 1pI" dp + 2 + dp N 2 N 2D pB
	I D PB (D )
(D )
Here M -c1pl = c1b2 -b Ic2 -c1pI is
negative as c1 is
small in the South. Hence
the first term is positive (because MS < 0) and dominates the second, which is
multiplied by c1 . As QN < 0, the third term is negative and the fourth positive .
But a2 is small in the North, so that the fourth term dominates . Hence we have
that
(4.53)
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a
8p D > 0
(4.49)
I
8(w/PB) PIc -1 M
> 0 when >
8 2 pI
b2 (4.50)
pB DpB
and
a
<0 .
8P -D (4.51)B
We therefore obtain, from (4.47) and (4 .51),
dPB
=C
cl a2p
A+
al~a2
2~
(Plcl'M)
+
(4.52)
dp DP 2 2JI B D DpB D
Since 8I'/8FT = d9
S/dFT > 0, by (4 . 42) the price of industrial goods pI rises as
the transfer to the South increases, i . e . ,
We next study the movements of the rate of return in the North rN as pI
changes . From the national income identity
As D = S -
	
I and pIXI - Xe - BD ,
In the North, P is large . We can therefore neglect terms other than those in ~,
giving
with
Hence as FT rises, pI rises and the profit rate in the North rN rises. Knowing
how rN moves enables us to find the sign of the change in the real wage in the
North . By (4.31),
Implicit differentiation gives :
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dpI/dFT > 0 . (4.54)
PIIND
= rK - FT
pIIS
= rK + 0ND - FT
pI = [(-Q/D) + r]/(al/D)
dpI __
dr D/a1 > 0 (4.55)
ac2w Pa r
Dp - D - ~w/
pB)
2
= 0
B
d(w/pB) -a20
dr DA
where A = a(c2/D - 2w/pB) . As A < 0 in the North by assumption, we have that
(4.56)
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point (iii) of Theorem 7 .
From (4 . 3) and (4. 4)
Hence
dr
d(w/pB)
dr
in the North. Hence an increase in FT raises the real wage in the North, as well
as the profit rate . The next step is to show that the consumption levels of B and
I rise in the North.
8IN N
IN = rK - FT = Or2 - FT , D = 29r 8r - 1 (4.58)D 8FT 8FT
which is positive for large 0 . Also,
BND = wL/pB = a(w/pB)2 (4.59)
so that
BND
also rises with FT by (4.57), (4.54), and (4.55) . We have now proven
Next we study the response of trade patterns to FT . By inverting
(4.12) and (4.13),
N __ N _ a1K c1L
XI S - ID D D - rK + FT .
N a1 caw 2
XI =
D
Rr -
DP
-Or + FT
B
- a c1 d(w/pB) + dFT dpID dr dpI dr
By the conditions of the theorem, the first term is negative . By (4 .57) the second
term is negative, and by (4. 56) it contains P. As (3 is large, these terms dom-
inate, and therefore
dXi/dr < 0 , (4 .60)
i . e . , the North's exports of the industrial good fall as Ft and hence rN rise . This
implies, of course, that the South's imports of industrial goods fall,
dMI/ drN < 0 .
	
(4.61)
We next check what happens to the volume of oil traded. This equals oil demanded
in the North, 0DN, which from (4.23) is
Now
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- awm - rQDpB D
Here 9 is large and Q is negative, by assumption . r rises, by (4 .55) . Hence
d0ND dXS
dFT dFT > 0
This proves points (i) and (ii) of Theorem 7 .
What remains is to study the behavior of the Southern economy. We first
show that rS rises with FT. This is done by showing that d~/drS < 0 . As
S SdMI	dM drN
fore compute now the sign of dMS/drS.
this will imply from (4.61) that drN/drS > 0, which in conjunction with (4. 54) and
(4.55) gives drS/dFT > 0 . From this last inequality the results follow . We there-
I
S S S S 2 oral clMI = ID -IS = rK + 0S + FT -IS = Or - D + Dp
+0
S + FT
B
dMI d(w_ /pB)
d0S dFT dMI
drS	-
9(2r -a1/D) + (cla/D) dr + dMS + dMSr S
dMI _ dO S _ dFT 8(w/pB)
dr S 1 d S dMS
)
=
P(2r
-
a1/D)
+ c1a/D ar
I
(4 .62)
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d6 S d6S drN < 0
dMS _ drN dMS
by (4 .61), (4 . 54), (4 .55) and (4. 6) . Similarly, dFT/dMi < 0 . By (4 . 56),
d(w/pB)/dr < 0 in the South. As by assumption aS is large, this establishes that
dMi/drS < 0 so that drS/dFT > 0. (4.63)
It now follows from (4 .56) and the fact that LAS < 0 by assumption, that real wages
in the South fall with FT . It follows immediately from (4.3) and (4 .5) that employ
ment and the consumption of basics also fall . This completes the proof of Theo-
rem 7 .
Theorem 8 .	Assumethat MS > 0, i. e . , c b2 - blc2 > 0 in the South. Let
pB
bel
Ssmall and
pI
> b2 at the initial equilibrium, with all other conditions as in Theorem
7 . Then an increase in the financial transfer FT to the South has the opposite
effects to those established in Theorem 7 : it leads to a fall in the price of the in -
dustrial good
PI
and a relative increase in the price of oil po, even though oil sup-
plies have increased . The oil exporter's terms of trade therefore improve . In
addition, oil exports and the rate of profit in the South decrease . The North exports
more industrial goods . Real wages, employment, and consumption of basics in-
crease in the South . In the North, the rate of profit and the real wage decrease .
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 7, the sign of dFT/dpI equals that of -dI'/dpI .
This is given in equation (4.43), or approximately in (4.53) . The latter may also
be written as
MD N
dDN
2
M
	dp
(M-c1pI)
p
+c
l
+~~.
d
B
p
a
2
_ aN
D
pB
I B (D ) I
where parameters and variables are of the South unless otherwise indicated . Now
note from (4 . 52) that for large (3N,
dpB/dpI = a1/a2
Hence the second term in (4 .64) is close to zero and (4. 64) can be expressed as
(4.64)
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aM
d[ pB c1 (b2 - p) -
d
dB
C2
b,
+ c
D pB pI pB I pI pB 1
Under the conditions of Theorem 8 and since dpB/dpI > 0 by (4.52), (4.65) is
negative, proving that the oil exporter's terms of trade improve, i . e . , pI falls
with FT .
(4 .65)
The rest of the theorem follows immediately. Inequality (4.55) implies
that the profit rate in the North falls, and (4. 56) implies that real wages in the
North fall . Inequality (4 . 60) tells us that the North's exports (and the South's im-
ports) of industrial goods will increase, and from (4.62) we then know that oil exports
of the South fall . Equation (4. 63) establishes that the rate of profit in the South
falls, and using (4 . 56) again proves that real wages, employment, and consumption
of basic goods all rise in the South. Thifj completes the proof.
Theorems 7 and 8 give conditions for opposite effects of a financial
transfer FT. The main difference in the conditions of Theorems 7 and 8 are : the sign
of the determinant MS, and the impact that the transfer has on the relative price
of industrial goods
pI. The sign of MS is positive in Theorem 8, and negative in
Theorem 7 . It seems more plausible that MS should be negative, since this hap-
pens when the basic goods sector in the South uses few capital inputs . Theorem 8
assumes, instead, that the basic goods sector is more capital intensive . The impact
of the transfer on prices seems also more plausible in Theorem 7 : transfers which
are used to develop oil supplies are likely to lead to lower, rather than higher, oil
prices . We therefore should expect the relative price of industrial goods to increase.
In Theorem 8, the transfer also increases oil supplies, but this leads to higher oil
prices, an outccue which appears less plausible .
Clearly, an empirical analysis of the actual conditions is needed to
ascertain which set of conditions is applicable . A priori however, the conditions
in Theorem 7 appear more intuitively natural than those in Theorem 8.
C. Conclusions
An inflow of foreign capital, wether used for consumption or investment,
inevitably affects the internal equilibrium of the receiving country . Consumption
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patterns, production patterns, and prices all change. The same is true of the
lending country : in changes its consumption pattern by making a loan, and for this
reason, and because the equilibrium of its trading partner changes, its own dom
estic equilibrium alters. A crucial factor in determining these macro effects of
a loan is the change in relative prices (oil prices, industrial prices, and prices
of basic goods that are not traded) . A loan must be one of significant size before
having a measurable impact on prices, and for the case of Mexico discussed in
Chichilnisky, Heal and McLeod (1984), where the transfer is of the order of 100
billion US dollars, it certainly fits this discription.
It is clear, then, that it is a complex matter to trace the full impacts of a
ban from one trading country to another . The model has enabled us to identify
these impacts in a rather simple fashion, because of our somewhat stylized assump
tions, and to assess the gains and the losses arising from such a loan for different
groups within the lending and borrowing countries .
One important feature to emerge is that the loan may have a beneficial
effect on the equilibrium of the lendin country. This happens when the borrowed
funds are used to increase oil supplies, leading to more abundant oil, increased
oil exports, and lower oil prices . The terms of trade of the lending country improve,
and this leads to higher levels of consumption of both goods in the lending country.
Theorem 7 establishes the conditions under which the welfare level in the lending
country will rise as a result. In making a social cost-benefit analysis of such a
loan, this is a point that should clearly be considered ; there is a social return to
the loan over and above the rate of interest paid on it . It is possible that even if a
major rescheduling that delayed repayment were to happen, the lending country as
a whole could nevertheless benefit.
Similar issues apply to the receiving country. The borrowing sector may
benefit in commercial terms from the loan, but a social cost-benefit analysis of
the loan should also take into account its effects on the overall economic equilibrium.
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As Theorem 7 shows, these could be substantially negative .
	
If there has been
overspecialization in one sector, thus leading to lower terms of trade for the
country, with correspondingly negative welfare effects . In summary, the fact that
a loan, if large, may affect the equilibrium pattern of prices and quantities in both
countries means that it will have macroeconomic consequences going far beyond its
impacts on the profits of the borrowing and lending institutions .
Theorems 7 and 8 have indicated two very different possible outoo mes. In
one case, the effects are beneficial to the lending and harmful to the borrowing
country, while in the other case the opposite is true . The distinguishing feature
is the effect of the loan on the oil exporter's terms of trade . In the first case, they
worsen, and in the second, they improve . Which of these two outcomes occurs
depends on the patterns of factor intensities in the receiving country and the initial
price levels . Once these are known, thus establishing whether the loan improves
or worsens the receiver's terms of trade, everything else can be traced. Experi-
ence indicates that over the last three years, the terms of trade of oil exporters
have worsened . While many factors have contributed to this price movement, this
suggests that a policy of borrowing to invest in the oil sector might not have been
the most favorable to the oil exporter . However, such a policy could be favorable
to the lender; it yields more oil at lower prices . Such macro outcomes should be
computed when discussing the present situation . The calculus of the debt must go
beyond the financial aspects, and must include the macroeconomic effects on prices,
imports, and exports of both countries .
It is important to emphasize that we have studied the consequences of
granting a loan before this was repaid . The repayments will not have effects that
are simply equal and opposite to those of the granting of the loan . The asymmetry
arises because, when the loan is made, it is invested or consumed in sectors dif-
ferent than those that will pay the debt. For instance, in this paper the debt was
used to build up the production capacity of the oil sector . However, when the load
is repaid, this will not, of course, coincide with running down this capacity. Invest-
ment is irreversible, and capital stock and machines depreciate . The loan will be
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repaid by running a balance-of-trade surplus . The effects of running a trade
surplus at a constant capacity level in the oil sector are not the opposite of those
of running a trade deficit and using the capital inflow to expand oil-producing
capacity . As a matter of fact, both could affect the major macro variables in the
same direction.
Finally, we point out a connection between the problem that we have
studied here and the extensive literature on the transfer problem in international
economics . This literature is concerned with the possibility that a transfer of
resources from one agent or country to another may benefit the donor and harm
the recipient. Chichilnisky (1980) showed for the first time that such an outcome
can occur in perfectly competitive markets with a unique and globally stable market
equilibrium . This issue has so far been studied only in the context of a barter
economy without production in the case of perfectly competitive general equilibrium
models . For surveys of these results, see Chichilnisky (1980), Jones (1983), and
Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) . Our present Theorem ? provides an example of the
transfer paradox in a production economy : resources are transferred from lender
to borrower, and the lender gains as a result, even though the receiver expands
its production capacity .
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The North-South model is, therefore, a system of 26 equations in 26
variables, depending on 18 exogenous parameters : a,, a2 , c 1 , c2 , a, L, P, K
D Dfor each region, plus I (S) and I (N) .
B . Comparative Statics Results
The economies of the North and of the South are identical except possibly
for the values of their exogenous parameters. Differences in the structural charac-
teristics of the two regions are described by differences in their exogenous para
meters . For instance, in the North the two sectors (B and I) use approximately the
same technology, i.e ., the economy is technologically homogeneous. This means
that a1/c 1 m. a2/c2 so that the determinant D(N)
of the matrix of technical coef-
ficients
a1
a2
c l
c2
is close to zero in the North . In the South, instead, technologies are dualistic.
The two sectors use factors very differently, and D(S) is therefore large . In both
regions D(N) and D(S) are positive, which indicates that the B-sector uses labor
more intensively than the I-sector . Another difference arises in factor markets .
In the North labor is relatively more scarce, i . e . , less responsive to increases in
the real wage w/pB. This
means a(N) is small. In the South the opposite is true,
a(S) is large . The reciprocal relations hold in capital markets : P(N) is large,
and P(S) is small. These parameter specifications can be presented so as to be
independent of the units of measurements .
It is worth noting that while most equations are linear in the variables,
some are not (e . g. , (2 . 3) is nonlinear) . The solutions also display nonlinearities,
as we shall see in the following.
Recall that a North-South economy is defined by : equations (2 .1) through
(2 .11) for each region, and (2 . 12) through (2. 15) . Exogenous parameters are a1 ,
c 1 , a2 , c2 , a, 9, L, K for each region, and ID(S), ID(N) . Endogenous parameters
are pB, PI, w, r, LS, LD, KS, KD, BS, BD, XB, IS, ID, XD for each region.
